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Abstract 
International organisations are ubiquitous in contemporary Europe and the wider 
world. This special issue takes a historical approach to exploring their relations with 
each other in Western Europe between 1967 and 1992. We seek to “provincialise” 
and “de-centre” the European Union’s role, exploring the interactions of its 
predecessors with other organisations like NATO, the OECD and the Council of 
Europe. This article develops the new historical research agenda of cooperation and 
competition among IOs and their role in European co-operation. The first section 
discusses the limited existing work on such questions among historians and in 
adjacent disciplines. The second section introduces the five articles and their main 
arguments. The third section goes on to elaborate common findings, especially 
regarding what we call the vectors for the development of policy ideas and practices 
and their transfer across different institutional platforms. 
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Multiple Connections in European Cooperation: 
International Organisations, Policy Ideas, Practices and Transfers 1967–19921 
 
International organisations (IOs) are ubiquitous in contemporary Europe and the 
wider world. They are even highly active in policy fields like education that are 
usually seen as closely connected with sensitive issues of culture and identity and 
often regarded as an exclusive national or even, in federal or unevenly decentralised 
states, sub-national competence. Thus, to give but a few examples, the global United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization promotes Holocaust 
education in cooperation with the formally international, but European-dominated 
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.2 The equally global Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) seeks to compare the success of 
different education systems, coordinating member states in joint evaluation 
programmes like PISA for testing the skills of fifteen-year-old pupils in mathematics, 
reading, and the natural sciences. 3  The pan-European Council of Europe in turn 
fosters the comparison and convergence of history teaching methods and content and 
the development of European school textbooks.4 Finally, the European Union (EU), 
with its smaller membership and only subsidiary competences in education, 
nevertheless runs multiple programmes for strengthening transnational co-operation 
and mobility, such as the Erasmus student exchanges, launched in 1987.5 
Thus, despite the strong inclination of European states to protect their competences in 
this policy field, as in some others, IOs are heavily involved in developing policy 
ideas, shaping practices, and facilitating the transfer of ideas and solutions across 
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borders. Clearly, the activism of IOs is even more marked in policy fields with a long 
history of technical or economic regulation and integration like transport, 
telecommunication, and trade. As in the case of education, their spatial, regulatory 
and thematic scope frequently varies, often resulting in overlapping competences, 
initiatives, and activities. It seems, as Karen Alter and Sophie Meunier have put it, 
“that every policy issue is nowadays the subject of multiple transborder agreements” 
resulting in a high degree of “density and complexity of international governance”;6 
or in what Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor in their study of the international 
regulatory conflict over plant genetic resources first termed international “regime 
complexity”.7 
Based on fresh archival research, this special issue adopts a historical approach to 
exploring cooperation and competition among IOs in Europe. The articles seek to 
understand overlapping IO activities, the development of new policy ideas and 
practices in such forums, and most importantly, their transfer among IOs. Together, 
they will create a strong conceptual and empirical basis for developing the 
historiography of IOs with a particular focus on exploring the exchange relations 
among them and the role of multiple actors in such processes – ranging from IO 
secretariats to experts, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), and, of 
course, member-state governments and agencies. The resulting research on the history 
of the EU and a set of IOs with a (not necessarily exclusive) focus on Europe is not 
just relevant to analysing IOs and their history, or European cooperation and 
integration. Instead, it is also crucially important for understanding their larger impact 
on the history of Europe in the twentieth century and beyond, as states have been 
more and more penetrated by international rules und working practices even when 
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they have formally retained exclusive competence over a particular issue or policy 
area. 
The special issue’s geographical focus is on Western Europe. With its peculiar 
combination of supranational institutional features, wide-ranging competences, legal 
integration and financial resources the EU has become increasingly hegemonic among 
IOs active in governing Europe since the end of the Cold War. The articles in this 
special issue seek to contribute to “provincialising”8 or “de-centring”9 the EU’s role 
in post-war European co-operation, however. They aim to contextualise the EU’s 
predecessors, especially the European Economic Community (EEC) created in 1957–
58 and usually referred to as the European Communities (EC) after the 1967 
institutional merger, in their exchange relations with other IOs like the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), the OECD and the Council of Europe, for example.  
This contextualisation is not just relevant for historians of the EU and its predecessors 
who for a long time focused too exclusively on this organisation as the apparent focal 
point of all cooperation or integration efforts in post-war (Western) Europe. It is also 
crucially important for contemporary historians of Europe more generally who 
sometimes still narrate national histories without systematic reference to the 
international interdependence of societies and the role of IOs including the EC. 
Finally, it carries broad implications for the interdisciplinary field of European 
Studies, particularly for the work of political scientists who normally also only 
examine one IO at a time and mostly concentrate on today’s European Union. 
The history of IOs in Eastern Europe and in East-West relations is of course an 
equally relevant topic, but distinct from this special issue’s core concern. Given our 
focus on transfers of ideas, concepts, and policy solutions among IOs, it seems 
legitimate to concentrate on Western Europe, where the overlap of membership and 
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the similarity of institutional set-up and political orientation made such exchange 
relations much more likely. Moreover, it is interesting to explore to what extent the 
Western post-war “script” about Western Europe as a laboratory of international 
policy ideas from human rights to the environment is corroborated or needs to be 
revised by historical research – the more so as the more recent Cold War 
historiography in an attempt to develop a more global perspective has de-centred 
Western Europe to the extent of neglecting such questions.10 
In other words, this special issue aims at understanding the present-day EU in its post-
war development as part of a web of international organisations in the Western world. 
In fact, the EC was often a latecomer to new policy fields like culture and the 
environment precisely because its initial focus was the creation of a common 
market.11 The EC frequently adopted and assimilated institutional rules and practices 
from member states. However, it also imported them from other IOs with an interest 
in governing Europe, adjusting them to its political and institutional setting, even 
where their spatial scope extended beyond Europe, as in the case of the OECD after 
its reform in 1961–62. Actually, it is perhaps surprising quite how many ideas and 
policy solutions the EC more or less copy-pasted from other IOs to adjust them to its 
own institutional framework and political objectives. 
Eventually, we hope that the new research agenda of cooperation and competition 
among IOs in dealing with transnational issues will allow a more fine-grained 
analysis of how, when, and why the present-day EU has indeed become hegemonic in 
governing Europe. We contend that the dominant literature that highlights intra-
organisational dynamics – most importantly the bargaining processes among member 
states – misses an important dimension. This also holds true for the research – less 
developed in history, and more prominent in political science – that focuses on inter-
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institutional dynamics or the interplay between the various institutions within the EU, 
such as the European Parliament, the Commission, and so on. 12  Instead, inter-
organisational links need more attention, since important developments in the history 
of the EU can only be explained through this lens. 
The agenda of this special issue thus transcends disciplinary boundaries and 
particularly speaks to debates in political science about today’s European Union and 
the role of other IOs. To foster this kind of interdisciplinary dialogue, the editors have 
invited Thomas Risse, one of the most distinguished political scientists in his field, to 
comment on the findings of this special issue from his perspective. His contribution 
underlines the interdisciplinary basis that this special issue builds on as well as the 
fruitfulness of such a conversation across disciplinary divides. 
For the purpose of this special issue we concentrate on the period from 1967, when 
the EC’s institutional merger took place, new social movements advanced new policy 
agendas, globalisation took off and the economic crisis after 1973 troubled Western 
Europe, through to 1992, when the end of the Cold War and the Maastricht Treaty 
transformed the role of the EC/EU quite fundamentally.  
Introducing the special issue, this article will develop the new historical research 
agenda of cooperation and competition among IOs and their role in European co-
operation. The first section will situate the special issue within the limited existing 
work on such questions among historians and in adjacent disciplines, especially 
International Relations. The second section will then introduce the five articles and 
their main arguments. The third section will go on to elaborate common findings from 
the empirical research, especially concerning the nature of and motives for 
cooperation and competition among IOs and what we call the vectors for the 
development of policy ideas and practices and their transfer across different 
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institutional platforms. In conclusion, we will develop some ideas for future research 
on the role of IOs in governing Europe. 
 
Understanding co-operation and competition among International Organisations 
 
Co-operation and competition among IOs (and among transnational business 
organisations for setting technical standards or dividing up markets in cartels, for 
example) has been widespread since their origins around the middle of the nineteenth 
century. At the start of the First World War, 37 IOs and 466 transnational 
organisations existed in Europe already.13 One particularly pertinent example of co-
operation and competition is the case of rail transport.14 This sector, like others using 
new technologies with transnational scope, was already characterised by inter-
organisational dynamics in the nineteenth century and in inter-war Europe. 
Co-operation and competition among IOs and transnational voluntary organisations 
continued unabated in post-war Western Europe, when the region turned into the 
world’s most crowded space for IOs. In fact, the growing number of IOs with 
horizontal functions across a number of different policy areas created even more 
overlap than between the League of Nations and the technical organisations of the 
1920s. Some, like the Council of Europe, were set up in the first instance because of 
competing visions for European co-operation and integration which European states 
had failed to resolve in other organisations – in the case of the Council of Europe this 
was the virulent conflict between France and the United Kingdom over whether to 
limit the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the predecessor 
of the OECD created in 1948, to trade liberalisation, as the British government 
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preferred, or to use it as a platform for more far-reaching economic and ultimately, 
political integration. 15  The Western European Union (WEU) is another example: 
evolving from the 1948 Treaty of Brussels originally signed by Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, this IO with a strong focus 
on military cooperation soon had to coordinate with and delimit itself from NATO, 
created one year later. But the WEU also rubbed shoulders with other IOs. As early as 
the 1950s, it delegated some of its tasks in the field of cultural policy to the Council 
of Europe, and the meetings in these IOs were full of talk about the need to rationalise 
their work in order to avoid overlap and duplication.16  
Researchers of Western European co-operation and integration after 1945 will 
intuitively recognise the importance of such co-operation and competition. Thus, 
when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded in 1951–2, its 
High Authority under the leadership of Jean Monnet immediately set out to establish 
formal relations with existing IOs not least to buttress its own role in coordinating the 
member states and shaping the new organisation’s external relations. Similarly, the 
setting up of the EEC impacted strongly on existing IOs and new ones created shortly 
afterwards. National administrations carefully reassessed the scope and limits of the 
Council of Europe, for instance, rethinking its future role on the ever more crowded 
stage of IOs in Western Europe.17 
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is another example. Founded by seven 
states in 1959–60, it sought to provide an alternative focus and to build bridges with 
the EEC after French President Charles de Gaulle’s 1958 veto against a larger 
Western European free trade zone in line with the 1956 British initiative in the 
OEEC.18 After de Gaulle’s 1963 veto against British EEC membership, the EEC and 
EFTA competed over accelerating their timetables for tariff reductions. Moreover, the 
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Danish government leveraged de Gaulle’s offer of separate EEC membership to 
demand (albeit without success) a kind of EFTA common agricultural policy to 
replicate the evolving EEC policy. Finally, in response to the 1964 surcharge crisis, 
when the new British Labour government illegally increased tariffs by 15 per cent 
across the board to reduce its balance of payments deficit, EFTA instituted an 
Economic Policy Committee to deal with similar disputes in the future, which was 
based on the OECD template and largely duplicated its activities.19 
Nonetheless, despite sometimes touching upon the theme in passing, contemporary 
historians of Western Europe so far have not systematically explored co-operation and 
competition among IOs and their impact on ideas, practices, and the transfer of policy 
solutions in European co-operation. Two conceptual and two more practical reasons 
appear to account for this. The first conceptual reason seems to lie in the character of 
European “integration” history as a research field which from its inception in the late 
1970s remained a rather small, tightly organised field, largely focused on the history 
of the present-day EU.20 Moreover, much of the early research on integration history 
was characterised by federalist undercurrents and teleological notions (also influenced 
by neo-functionalist political science literature) of integration as a continuous 
“process” towards ever-greater “deepening” and “widening”, ultimately resulting in 
the present-day EU. 21  This literature normally assumed that their alleged 
“supranationality” made the ECSC and the EEC creatures sui generis, and as a result, 
they were not placed in relation to other IOs or compared to them. The allegedly 
“advanced” character of ECSC/EEC integration seemed to make it unnecessary to 
identify, let alone explore, exchange relations with other IOs except perhaps for the 
ECSC/EEC’s seemingly unilateral impact on them. Paradoxically, trying to counteract 
this trend in the historiography, even the economic historian Alan S. Milward, while 
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advancing his notion of European integration as the result of the intergovernmental 
bargaining of “national interests” by member states, still focused largely on the 
origins of the ECSC and the EEC.22 
The second conceptual reason why inter-organisational relations among IOs in post-
war Western European co-operation are understudied is the dominant if often implicit 
realist epistemological perspective of much of the European “integration” literature. 
Whether interested in national governments and their bargaining or the new 
“supranational” institutions and their activism, much of this literature was for a long 
time predominantly focused on decision-making moments: the creation of new 
organisations, the revision of existing treaties and, more recently, the trajectory of 
major policy domains such as the Common Agricultural Policy, for example.23 In 
contrast, the articles in this special issue are also interested in the intellectual roots of 
governance practices. Our approach owes a lot to cultural and transnational history in 
a broad sense and to their sensitivity to a history of knowledge, representations, and 
perceptions as well as to connections, transfers, and entanglements. This research also 
focuses on other phases of policy-making such as agenda-setting and policy review 
and implementation. 
The first of two more practical reasons for the lack of more systematic exploration of 
the exchange relations among IOs lies in the dominant focus of the literature not just 
on the ECSC/EEC/EC, but also on other IOs, on the history of a single IO – a focus 
that has often been fostered by the IOs in question in an attempt to cultivate their own 
historical legacy. Thus, the European Commission has sponsored research based 
largely on oral history interviews, into its own institutional history.24 Similarly, the 
first and so far only, edited volume on the first years of the OEEC resulted from its 
decision to open its archives and apply a more liberal 15-year rule (as opposed to the 
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customary 30) for access to its sources.25 Although the OEEC, unlike the European 
Commission, did not interfere in the research and publication process, it was 
nevertheless keenly interested in counteracting the strong pull of the EU in the early 
1990s. Other IOs, including the Council of Europe, have displayed a similar interest 
in safeguarding their institutional memory and historical legacy.26 
The major resources needed to study co-operation and competition among IOs more 
systematically constitutes the second practical reason for why the theme has largely 
been neglected by contemporary historians of Western Europe. Studying one IO and 
its activities already constitutes a challenge, especially if such organisations are 
treated, as in this special issue, as more than a forum for bargaining among member 
states. In fact, IOs have agency of their own.27 Secretariats seek to carve out a role for 
themselves and to develop new policy initiatives, experts are heavily involved in 
debating issues and setting agendas, and INGOs try to propagate their ideas and 
interests by lobbying IO secretariats as well as member state governments and 
agencies. Reconstructing the interaction of multiple actors, including the governments 
of member states, applicant countries, and the United States as Western Europe’s 
benign hegemon, is challenging enough for one IO alone. Tracing their networks and 
exchange relations across a variety of institutional venues is even more demanding. 
Moreover, many policy issues are interconnected, adding to the complexity of 
transnational governance – something that historians can perhaps only reconstruct in 
teamwork, which is not easily funded or compatible with the discipline’s rather 
traditional individual mode of research and writing. 
More surprisingly perhaps, research in International Relations, too, has only recently 
started to study inter-organisational links among IOs. Earlier research in the neo-
functionalist tradition was primarily concerned with understanding incentives for IOs, 
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especially the EC, to expand from one policy area into other, functionally connected 
areas.28 It also developed the notion of geographical “spill-over”, which sought to 
explain why the EC began to attract new members soon after it was set up, with 
repercussions for other IOs like EFTA. This research was very much preoccupied 
with explaining “core Europe” integration, however. It was not open towards 
researching imports by the EC of policy ideas, practices, and solutions from other 
IOs. 
Similarly, the sociological-institutionalist so-called Stanford School developed the 
notion of “diffusion”.29 It started from the assumption that hegemonic centres (such as 
the EC) could develop norms and policy ideas, and then spread them to other 
countries, regions, and IOs, but did not actually analyse the (negotiated) transfer 
processes. While interested in “diffusion” via different forms of connections, its 
conceptualisation as a unidirectional process buttressed the notion of movement of 
ideas and policy solutions from one self-contained space to another, much as in the 
early literature on cultural transfers in the historiography of early modern and modern 
Europe in the 1980s and early 1990s. 30  The unidirectional conceptualisation of 
“diffusion” actually impedes research on exchange relations as multidirectional 
processes of debate, negotiation and selective adoption, which result in new, hybrid 
institutional and policy outcomes. 
The more recent International Relations literature tries to overcome these limitations. 
It seeks to conceptualise and trace the origins of the complexity of competition and 
cooperation among IOs either (in the neo-functional tradition) in spill-over from 
negotiations in one policy field to another, within or across IOs,31 or alternatively, in 
the multiplication of international agreements,32 sub-groups of member states in IOs 
interested in deepening co-operation and integration,33 packages combining different 
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agreements that link issues or policy areas across different IOs,34 or the deliberate 
creation of strategic ambiguity to allow governments and other actors space for 
interpretation drawing on different and competing sets of international 
commitments.35 
Other International Relations research is more interested in how the resulting 
complexity impacts on the strategies of actors and the implementation of international 
agreements. Thus, Alter and Meunier have emphasised the importance of “forum-
shopping” by actors for implementing agreements in different IOs which best serve 
their interests.36 Ultimately, such strategies can effect shifting an existing set of rules 
from one IO to another. This literature has highlighted what it calls the bounded 
rationality that characterises the strategies of different actors who operate across a 
variety of IOs. In other words, in an assumption that most historians will likely 
endorse, the complexity of international co-operation and competition is so 
pronounced that most actors find it difficult to assess what may be in their best 
interest, or to formulate rational choices in line with these interests – something that 
makes the development of ideas and agendas as well as the identification of and the 
agreement on policy solutions “more permeable”, allowing for a much greater role of 
IO secretariats, experts, and INGOs, not just national governments.37 Thus, the role of 
INGOs in linking IOs and advancing policy ideas across different institutional venues 
is definitely one of several promising routes for future contemporary historical 
research in this field. 
Some International Relations research has begun to utilise concepts and methods 
developed in other social science disciplines to explore co-operation and competition 
among IOs and the resulting outcomes. 38  This research frequently draws on 
organisation studies in economics and social network analysis originally developed by 
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sociologists. The analysis of networks of actors in transnational and international 
politics has of course also been used by historians including in the field of European 
integration history, 39  although they have usually employed a less formal 
methodology. As Rafael Biermann has found in studying European and Atlantic 
security institutions, inter-organisational networking is often a response to 
transnational challenges that “single organizations (and states) cannot master on their 
own”. Biermann has also highlighted, however, that such networking faces many 
obstacles, which in turn could also help historians explain competition among IOs and 
inefficiencies of policy-making instead of synergies. He argues that such obstacles 
include inter alia a history of institutional rivalry, interest in guarding one’s autonomy 
and fear of compromise and its potential effect on the respective IO’s identity.40 
Other disciplines have started to join the conversation. Most notably, legal scholars 
Bruno de Witte and Anne Thies have recently assessed the place of the EU in the 
architecture of international legal co-operation, stressing particularly the legal nature 
of the choices that nation-states make when choosing a specific IO to cooperate 
internationally.41 Legal history research has also highlighted the importance of private 
actors, especially firms, in mobilising EC law and fostering the organisation’s legal 
further integration through the European Court of Justice’s case law – just as 
individuals can appeal to the European Court of Human Rights established in 1959 to 
protect their rights against member state institutions. 42  In contrast, IOs like the 
OECD, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, today WTO) and 
NATO have formal and informal mechanisms for dispute resolution among member 
state governments only. 43  Such legal differences, as well as the interconnections 
between legal orders, are often ignored by historians and other scholars. They help to 
explain why a certain group of actors might prefer one IO over the other; why 
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disputes often play out simultaneously in several organisations with partly 
overlapping or competing competences; and why the ways they solve these issues 
differ markedly. For all these reasons, venue choice, overlap, and dependency are so 
crucial. 
In sum, therefore, there seems be an increasing awareness of the need to stop 
analysing the history of the EU in isolation, and to stress the multiple links among IOs 
that have competed, co-operated, interacted with each other in a variety of other ways, 
all in an attempt to “build Europe”. 
 
Human rights, environment, security, culture, and regions 
 
This brief survey of the limited historiography and social science research has already 
highlighted several key motives and reasons for co-operation and competition among 
IOs which the authors discuss in their articles. Their combination in this form does 
not just reflect the merely incipient research on this key aspect of post-war European 
co-operation. Rather, the articles address five distinct policy challenges that loomed 
large on the agenda of various European IOs between the late 1960s and the early 
1990s: human rights violations (Fernández Soriano), environmental degradation 
(Meyer), security threats and détente opportunities (Romano), cooperation in the 
cultural field (Calligaro and Patel), and the role of regions in European co-operation 
(Wassenberg). At the same time, the authors explore the collaboration between the 
EC and a variety of other IOs: the Council of Europe (Fernández Soriano, Calligaro 
and Patel, Wassenberg), the OECD (Meyer) and NATO (Romano). Finally, the 
articles also address the roles of different sets of actors who played an especially 
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influential role in linking IOs in their particular case study: national governments 
(Calligaro and Patel, Romano), elected and delegated parliamentarians (Fernández 
Soriano, Calligaro and Patel), experts (Meyer), interest groups (Wassenberg) and 
policy entrepreneurs (Calligaro and Patel), thus creating a fascinating kaleidoscope of 
forms of co-operation and competition among IOs. 
Víctor Fernández Soriano investigates how European IOs developed their policies on 
human rights. In the early 1960s, the issue of the possible accession of Franco’s Spain 
already helped the EEC to debate and to clarify its conditions for membership which 
henceforth de facto included a democratic constitution. Greece concluded the first 
association agreement with the EEC in 1961, which provided for a privileged 
economic relationship and the prospect of eventual membership. In April 1967, 
however, a group of colonels seized power. Greece was a member of the Council of 
Europe, alongside its association with the EEC. Parliamentarians from both IOs’ 
assemblies pushed for a strong response to human rights violations by the colonels’ 
regime, with the aim of imposing sanctions on the new military dictatorship. 
Fernández Soriano demonstrates that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe was the driving force in this process. Examining the inter-organisational 
dynamics between the two European IOs, he argues that the EC imported policy 
positions and normative ideas from the Council of Europe. This transfer was greatly 
facilitated by individual parliamentarians. It prepared the ground in the EC/EU for an 
emerging human rights agenda, so-called conditionality for formalised membership 
conditions and its policy of foreign aid for developing countries. All the while, the 
protagonists in this battle were able to draw on the normative framework of the well-
established United Nations Declaration on Human Rights proclaimed by the UN 
General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 already. 
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Environmental degradation constituted another new policy challenge for IOs.44 By the 
late 1960s, specialised IOs had been dealing with environmental protection issues for 
some time. Concerns about the consequences of the growing use of chemicals in 
agriculture, the short-term risks and long-term impact of nuclear power, and other 
environmental threats motivated the environmental protest movements and stirred IOs 
into activity. With most environmental issues like air and water pollution being 
transnational in character, the United Nations organised the Conference on the Human 
Environment in Stockholm in 1972.45 Other IOs ranging from the Council of Europe 
and NATO to the OECD and the EC also became active in the new policy field. 
Jan-Henrik Meyer focuses on the discussion and definition of the Polluter Pays 
Principle (PPP), which became enshrined into environmental policy almost 
simultaneously in the OECD and the EC in the early 1970s. Meyer explores the 
multiple avenues for the transfer of underlying policy ideas and for the definition of 
the PPP. He shows how experts and expertise played a key role in the selection of 
particular policy concepts. At the same time, the respective IO’s institutional set-up 
and political context largely determined how the PPP was adapted. In fact, the OECD, 
despite its focus on economic liberalisation, ended up with a more environment-
oriented definition of the PPP. In contrast, the interests of businesses concerned with 
the possible costs of a stricter PPP definition and implementation prevailed in the EC, 
which initially adopted a more loosely defined approach. 
While in the fields of human rights and environmental protection the EC initially 
received new policy ideas more than shaping and exporting them, in security of all 
policy areas, paradoxically, it sometimes succeeded in developing new ideas and 
inserting them into other IOs, as Angela Romano demonstrates. After all, within the 
Western world defence and security constituted core competences of NATO created 
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in 1949. EC countries including the United Kingdom, which joined in 1973, and not 
just France, shared a keen interest in developing a common approach to foreign policy 
challenges. Already in the process leading up to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, this 
induced the EC member states strongly to coordinate their positions.46 
In the early 1980s, the EC expanded its cooperation to encompass disarmament 
issues. Romano explores how the EC’s foray into disarmament provoked competition 
and co-operation with NATO. She reveals the EC origins of the proposal for a 
Conference on Disarmament in Europe and how EC member state governments and 
leading politicians like the French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and the 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt succeeded in implanting it in NATO. In an era 
of new East-West confrontation following the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of 
Afghanistan, and of growing transatlantic tensions in the wake of Ronald Reagan’s 
election to the US presidency, the EC collectively sought to avoid further escalation 
between NATO and the Soviet bloc to protect as best as possible the notion and 
practices of 1970s détente. 
With its strong focus on economic integration from its inception in the 1950s the EC 
had no formal competences in the field of culture. In contrast, cultural co-operation 
had been a core activity of the Council of Europe since its creation in 1949. Together 
with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the 
Council of Europe therefore initially dominated multilateral co-operation, alongside 
bilateral agreements on cultural exchange as contained in the 1963 Elysée Treaty 
between France and Germany.47 
In their article, Oriane Calligaro and Kiran Klaus Patel explore the incremental 
process through which the EC eventually became the key IO in fostering cultural co-
operation by the end of the Cold War.48 They explore two case studies: for the 1970s, 
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the debates about cultural heritage and the European Architectural Heritage Year; 
and, for the 1980s, the development of a European audio-visual policy. In both cases, 
the Council of Europe took the lead as a laboratory for developing ideas and policies 
later adapted by the EC for its purposes. As Calligaro and Patel argue, its governance 
structure, financial resources, market integration and generally increasing 
competences allowed the EC to become a much more significant player in the field of 
culture. 
Similarly, the Council of Europe also preceded the EC in promoting co-operation 
among local and regional authorities. It established a regular conference forum as 
early as 1957, where local actors and associations were represented and tried to 
influence emerging European regional policies.49 Birte Wassenberg analyses the links 
between the Council of Europe and the EC in the development of regional policy 
from the 1970s through to the early 1990s. She focuses on three vectors for the 
transmission of ideas and policy solutions: institutional co-operation between the two 
IOs; competitive bargaining among a variety of local and regional groups; and 
intensive lobbying of the EC. 
Wassenberg shows how the EC sought to buttress its strong position in inter-IO 
relations by strategically limiting direct dialogue with the Council of Europe. Thus, 
formalised co-operation between the two IOs, their committees, and involved experts 
was not the most important transmission belt for the transfer of ideas and policy 
solutions. Rather, local and regional authorities worked closely together across 
regional and national borders. Their networking was geared towards ensuring that 
they would be closely associated with, and able to shape the evolving European 
regional policy. From 1988 onwards, these networks shifted their attention more and 
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more from the Council of Europe to the EC, not least because of the prospect of 
receiving direct funding from the European Commission. 
 
Co-operation and competition: vectors of transfers 
 
The five articles together with Thomas Risse’s comment in this special issue provide 
fascinating insights into the vectors of cooperation, competition, and transfer among 
European IOs. Three vectors are of particular importance: ideas, actors, and 
institutions. 
The authors do not conceptualise ideas as intellectual discoveries or discourses of a 
general nature. Instead, they are keenly interested how ideas are connected to social, 
economic, and political developments in Europe. More concretely, the authors inquire 
into how IOs have contributed to developing ideas to inform policy solutions to 
shared problems, and how such policy solutions have been negotiated, stabilised, and 
implemented. 
Several authors stress the importance of public debate and pressures for how IOs have 
identified policy issues and sought to address them. Thus, despite the fact that the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
dated from 1950, the Cold War rationale often overrode human rights concerns in the 
treatment of Western authoritarian regimes. The colonels’ establishment in 1967 of a 
new dictatorship in Greece, the apparent cradle of European democracy, however, 
was sharply criticised in Western Europe. As Fernández Soriano demonstrates, the 
resulting public pressure for counter-measures against the new regime drove and 
buttressed the strongly critical response by elected parliamentarians in the assemblies 
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of the Council of Europe and the EC in the following years. Similarly, as Meyer 
demonstrates, the new environmental movement forcefully demanded stronger 
protection measures. Apocalyptic visions of the future of mankind as in the Club of 
Rome’s 1972 report created pressures on IOs as well as their member states to take up 
this new policy challenge effectively if they wanted to remain relevant.50  
Other pressures were of a more institutional nature. Thus, the strengthening of the role 
of regions in the Maastricht Treaty that created the EU was at least in part induced by 
the lobbying of local and regional authorities, as Wassenberg shows. At the time, their 
preferences reflected far more widespread concerns about the future of the regions in 
a more integrated Europe. Based on strong identities, existing constitutional rights, 
and public support, local and regional authorities pushed for the EU to buttress 
ongoing decentralisation processes in highly centralised member states like France 
and to protect their competences in federal states like Germany. The new notion of a 
Europe of the regions complemented their interest in access to funding for regional 
development. Ultimately, this also provoked the shift in the primary focus of local and 
regional authorities from the Council of Europe to the EC. 
In this broader societal context, politicians and experts formulated policy responses 
and concrete proposals for action by IOs and their member states. In the case of the 
Greek human rights violations the options were clear enough: suspension of 
membership in the Council of Europe, which the colonels pre-empted by leaving the 
organisation, and the suspension of the EC’s association agreement. Parliamentary 
fact-finding missions to Greece prepared the decisions on these issues. Other authors 
study the formation of broader policy principles like the Polluter Pays Principle in the 
case of Meyer and the proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in the case of 
Romano, or of concrete policy initiatives like the EC’s expansion into audio-visual 
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policy in the case of Calligaro and Patel. While these policy ideas were politically 
contested, IO and member state officials and diplomats as well as external expert 
advisors nevertheless played an important role in developing and transferring them 
among IOs. 
These and other actors themselves constituted a second vector for co-operation and 
competition among IOs and the transfer of policy ideas and solutions. Despite their 
limited focus on particular policy issues, the articles in this special issue underline the 
extraordinary diversity of actors capable of initiating such transfers. Their findings 
clearly contradict simplistic notions in realist International Relations theory and 
traditional diplomatic historiography of states and governments as the only relevant 
actors in international politics.  
States and governments matter, of course, especially in foreign policy as Romano 
shows in her article on co-operation and competition between the EC and NATO. 
Following the 1970 Davignon Report the EC member states sought to enhance their 
foreign policy co-operation through the creation of the European Political Co-
operation (EPC) mechanism, 51  which they used effectively to co-ordinate their 
policies in the Helsinki process during the first half of the 1970s. In the 1980s, as 
Romano demonstrates, the governments drew on the EPC as a vehicle for protecting 
the notion and practice of détente. After the opening in the Soviet Union from 1985 
onwards, they finally succeeded in getting the US administration to align itself with 
the EC preference for a Conference on Disarmament in 1987. In the case of détente 
leading politicians fostered cooperation among IOs to facilitate the transfer from the 
EPC to the NATO context. Below the level of political decision-making, officials and 
experts may have played a role in advancing and transferring policy ideas between the 
EPC and NATO, but they are not the focus of Romano’s article, which concentrates 
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on understanding interaction among governments. Calligaro and Patel also show how 
member state governments had very different priorities for developing audio-visual 
policy through the Council of Europe and the EC, something that impacted strongly 
on the institutional and policy choices. 
Regarding other issues, however, multiple other actors were influential. In the case of 
regional policy, Wassenberg demonstrates the great importance of local and regional 
state actors, not national governments. Fernández Soriano shows how elected 
parliamentarians without a government role strongly influenced government 
responses in the Council of Europe and the EC to Greek human rights violations. In 
environmental policy, economists and natural scientists sought to shape the definition 
of the PPP drawing on their expertise and public pressure for tighter environmental 
regulation emanating from grassroots movements and INGOs – pressure that they 
often generated themselves through close co-operation with these organisations to 
foster their vision of environmental protection. As in the case of the OECD and the 
EC, experts were frequently active across a variety of IO venues, which made it 
comparatively easy for them to pick up ideas and policy solutions in one context and 
transfer them to another that appeared more promising for a particular form of 
implementation. 
It becomes clear across the articles in this special issue, moreover, that individuals 
with a high level of commitment to a certain cause were often important for 
developing a particular agenda and linking IOs. This is a finding of fine-grained 
historical research that is often lost on International Relations scholars who tend to 
prioritise structure over the agency of individuals, as they would put it. Where this 
literature has addressed the role of individuals it has called them “policy” or “norm” 
entrepreneurs with particular forms of social capital, to use Bourdieu’s language.52 
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The authors give multiple examples of such individual entrepreneurship. Thus, 
Calligaro and Patel analyse the role of Duncan Sandys among others, the co-founder 
of the United Europe movement in Britain after the Second World War. He helped 
link the Council of Europe and the EC in his attempt to protect Europe’s architectural 
heritage and to develop greater EC activism in the field of culture. As Fernández 
Soriano shows, parliamentarians were sometimes able to advance and implement their 
initiatives when they acquired executive roles, as in the case of Edoardo Martino who 
entered the EC Commission in 1967 or Max van der Stoel who became Dutch foreign 
minister in 1973.  
The IOs themselves, their institutional set-up, competences, and working practices 
constitute a third vector for co-operation, competition, and transfers. Thus, their 
limited financial resources and formal competences induced the Council of Europe 
and the OECD to develop into laboratories for the discussion of new policy ideas and 
solutions. In the case of the OECD in particular, exporting such new ideas to other 
IOs and member states was, and still is, a crucial source of its own institutional 
legitimacy. The Council of Europe, too, has often acted as a forum for policy 
deliberation. It had a more competitive relationship with the EC, however, not least 
because it was also a European IO without non-European membership. 
To secure space for themselves in the European and global co-operation and 
competition, IOs normally crafted specific institutional mechanisms for establishing 
themselves in a new policy field. Thus, as Meyer explains, the OECD, despite its 
primary mission of economic liberalisation, was the first IO to establish a separate 
environmental committee, although this choice also entailed the danger of segregating 
and marginalising rather than “mainstreaming” environmental concerns within the 
organisation.53 IOs frequently expanded into new policy areas without possessing a 
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formal competence. This is true of the EC, which developed the 1973 Environmental 
Action Programme but only acquired formal competence for environmental policy 
with the 1987 Single European Act. In the peculiar case of the OECD, the collective 
representation of the EC by the European Commission from 1962 onwards, alongside 
the member states, created another institutional vector for debate and transfer from 
one IO context to another. In the meantime, the Lisbon Treaty has given the EU a 
legal personality of its own under international law. This actually makes it more like a 
state (which can operate inside IOs) rather than just being an IO, with its own member 
states. 
Three key characteristics contributed to the EC’s particular strength in its relations 
with other IOs during the period from 1967 to 1992: its focus on market integration, 
its legal integration, and its financial resources. To begin with, the EC’s original focus 
on creating a customs union and a broad internal market created functional 
connections with other policy areas, or at least allowed actors to claim such 
connections and use them as an instrument for expanding the EC’s policy remit and 
developing new initiatives. The European Commission pro-actively sought to identify 
new policy fields to strengthen the EC, but also its own institutional role within it. 
This was the case for the environment, for example, as Meyer shows. Here, the 
European Commission could claim to be in the vanguard of policy-making to protect 
citizens from environmental hazards like pollution. As Calligaro and Patel highlight, 
however, market integration also provided an opportunity for the European 
Commission to expand into the field of culture. With the support of the Court of 
Justice it claimed that cultural products could not enjoy a blanket exception from the 
rules of the internal market.54 
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The EC’s greater legal integration enhanced the effects of its market integration. The 
EC had to rely on the member state governments and administrations to implement 
EC law. Moreover, lacking policing powers it also depended, and largely continues to 
depend, on the voluntary compliance of member states with EC/EU law and decisions 
by the Court of Justice. Nevertheless, the slow emergence of an EC constitutional 
culture with legally binding commitments and control of their implementation by an 
independent judiciary gave the EC a major advantage over other IOs that had to rely 
entirely on the willingness of member states to transpose more general 
recommendations and targets into national law.55 Moreover, individuals could appeal 
to the EC’s court, whereas this was not the case in organisations such as the OECD 
and NATO. This direct connection to companies and individuals in the member states 
also helps to explain why the EC sometimes managed to develop a position of 
hegemony. Another factor came on top: through its generally pro-integration 
jurisdiction until the 1990s, the Court of Justice was able to support the European 
Commission in expanding the EC’s policy remit, especially through an extensive 
interpretation of the scope of economic integration. As Calligaro and Patel show, this 
impacted strongly on the field of culture. 
At the same time, the EC’s legal integration could also act as a deterrent against 
agreeing more binding commitments in the first instance. Thus, as Meyer 
demonstrates, organised industry in the EC was keen to avoid the higher costs 
resulting from environmental legislation. As a result, the EC ended up with a 
definition of the Producer Pays Principle that was less stringent than that of the 
OECD, conventionally seen as one of the most pro-liberalisation and business-
friendly IOs. 
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The third characteristic was the EC’s much greater financial resources. Some IOs like 
the OECD and the equally global Food and Agriculture Organization only had 
funding for their own secretariats, for statistical research, fact-finding missions and 
expert committee work. The Council of Europe, too, had limited funds at its disposal. 
As Wassenberg shows, it could offer local and regional authorities a platform for the 
exchange of ideas, develop policy solutions, and encourage their implementation. 
When the EC created its own regional policy, which distributed funds for the 
development of poorer EC regions, however, it quickly became the focal point of 
lobbying. When it started to foster the notion of a Europe of the regions, moreover, 
the EC also promised to strengthen the institutional and constitutional role and rights 
of localities and regions within the member states, which made it even more attractive 
as an institutional site for their interests and agendas. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The articles in this special issue cover different IOs alongside the EC, and a variety of 
policy challenges. As a result, their findings are necessarily incomplete. Nonetheless, 
they have allowed the identification of three vectors – policy ideas, actors, and 
institutional settings – as key explanatory factors for co-operation, competition, and 
transfers among European IOs during the period from 1967 to 1992. Moreover, three 
characteristics help explain why and how the EC succeeded in playing a stronger role 
in the battle among IOs for a more prominent role in addressing common challenges, 
developing policy ideas and agendas and identifying and transferring policy solutions. 
These are the EC’s focus on market integration, its greater legal integration, and its 
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much larger financial resources to attract multiple state and non-state actors into its 
orbit as the most suitable site for articulating their concerns, making demands, and 
negotiating policy. In this way, a division of labour appears to have developed over 
time between the EC and other European IOs, whereby the latter mainly function as 
laboratories for policy ideas relevant to Europe (and other world regions) and the EC 
focuses on their detailed formulation, implementation and funding. 
This division of labour has created a variable geometry of European integration and 
co-operation, where European non-EC/EU states, depending on their precise status, 
are more or less marginal to EC/EU policy-making and need to utilise other IOs like 
the Council of Europe more to have any kind of voice. The impact of this variable 
geometry has been relativised by the EU’s expansion to 28 member states (2016) 
since 1992, which has significantly increased its overlap with Europe as a 
geographical space. Nonetheless, it is still highly relevant to countries like Norway, 
which accesses the internal market through the European Economic Area, to some 
Balkan countries without the immediate prospect of EU membership, for example, but 
also to the United Kingdom if and when it leaves the EU after the “Brexit” vote in the 
2016 referendum. 
Despite the still limited research to date on inter-organisational relations among IOs 
in historical perspective, Kiran Klaus Patel has developed a tentative typology of 
EC/EU relations with other European IOs.56 The findings from the articles in this 
special issue are not systematically comparative enough to fully allow its testing. 
Combined with other incipient research in a similar vein, however, they facilitate 
some general conclusions and support his claims. Thus, in policy fields with no 
alternative forums and strong EC competences, like agriculture, little interaction 
between the EC and other IOs appears to have taken place. The EC developed the 
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Common Agricultural Policy with strong redistributive effects, which initially made 
up 80 per cent of its budget. Other IOs with a more global scope like the OECD and 
the Food and Agriculture Organization in turn limited themselves in this policy area 
to policy deliberation and statistical work. Crucially, its regulatory and fiscal powers 
combined helped transform the EC into an emerging polity and primary site for non-
state actors, too, who increasingly sought to influence the EC’s policy-making to 
protect their own interests.. In policy areas, where it dominated policy-making, the 
EC could nevertheless serve as a template for third countries and other settings, as 
when the Danish government advocated a similar “supranational” agricultural policy 
for EFTA during the 1960s. 
In other areas the present-day EU overlapped heavily with existing forums. This was 
the case for infrastructures including the transport sector, for example, where several 
existing organisations were founded in inter-war Europe and often carried over 
practices from the nineteenth century.57 In such fields, the EC was often ineffectual 
despite having competences. The mode of interaction was characterised by crowding 
out of other IOs over time. Especially from the 1970s onwards the EC tried to bring 
the existing effective organisations within its remit in some way or another, and to 
develop a hegemonic role in regulatory matters. 
In new policy issues, and fields, other IOs frequently developed and advocated ideas 
and policy solutions earlier than the EC. Examples of this would be the Council of 
Europe in the field of culture and the UN in the field of environmental policy. These 
IOs’ pro-active role sometimes led to partial convergence or cooperation as modes of 
interaction, and inward transfers into the EC from them. Finally, the present-day EU 
and its member states have become embedded in IOs like the OECD and the GATT, 
for example, where transfer processes take place mainly within the IO. In these cases, 
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the EC has been able to contribute in a pan-European or global setting, rather than 
interacting with other IOs as a separate entity. In these cases, it has profited from its 
peculiar constitutional character as an IO with many state-like features with, since the 
Lisbon Treaty, its own legal personality under international law. 
Our findings thus confirm and substantiate the claims of the first attempt to 
systematise the forms of interaction among IOs in post-war Western Europe. They 
also demonstrate that much more work remains to be done to fully understand the past 
and present role of organisations such as the EC/EU, the Council of Europe, the 
OECD and NATO and particularly the factors and forces that drive them. In his 
comment, Thomas Risse underscores the significance of historical work to arrive at 
fine-grained answers for such issues, and how much history and political science can 
learn from each other in pursuing this research agenda further.  
Beyond the role of IOs and their worktravails this collection of articles also sheds new 
light on the history of the Cold War. They demonstrate that the Cold War – often seen 
as the defining feature for this period of European history, and for the role of IOs 
particularly – impacted to a very different extent on the various forums and issues 
discussed here. While détente and East-West relations stood front and centre in the 
interaction between NATO and the EC in the debate about military security 
(Romano), human rights concerns explicitly clashed with Cold War priorities in the 
case of the debate about the Greek junta (Fernández Soriano). Interestingly, inter-
organisational dynamics were particularly strong where actors in the Council of 
Europe and the EC challenged the Cold War lens. In culture (Calligaro and Patel), 
actors actively strove to overcome the East-West divide. Cold War concerns were 
largely absent from the debates about regions (Wassenberg) and the environment 
32  
(Meyer). Having said this, Cold War institutions, particularly NATO, mattered for the 
transatlantic transfers in environmental policy. 
The articles in this special issue do not support Akira Iriye’s recent claim that the 
Cold War was but a footnote to human rights history, and that IOs and transnational 
forces more broadly may serve as the core of an alternative narrative of European and 
global developments since 1945.58 Nevertheless, given that for a long time the Cold 
War has been seen as an all-pervading reality, impacting on security and foreign 
policy debates, but also on issues as diverse as sexuality, technology, popular culture, 
urban planning and economic policies, the articles’ findings are remarkable. They 
help to challenge the Cold War lens that has dominated much of the historiography on 
post-war European history and IOs, and to confirm the idea that at least during some 
phases since 1945, European IOs have been able to insulate and even to de-couple 
some of their concerns from the East-West conflict.59 Since several of the articles also 
cover the period of the 1980s, when East-West tensions reached a new climax, the 
findings are all the more astonishing. This special issue cannot give conclusive 
answers in this regard either, but it helps to break new ground and refocus the debate 
on the history of cooperation and integration in post-war Western Europe, the role of 
IOs, and the Cold War in Europe. 
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